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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
FRED 0. WOLD,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
-vs.OGDEN CITY, a Municipal Corporation, and WHEELWRIGHT
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
OF OGDEN, UTAH,
Defendants and
Respondents.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
While appellant's statement of facts is accurate in
most particulars, it is incorrect in several matters which
are very material. We shall consider these briefly.
First, appellant, on page two of his brief says,
"The trench extended from Grant Avenue to Washington
Avenue . . . " ~his is not in accord either with the
facts or the statement thereof before the trial Court.
The statement on which the Court ruled was "Our
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evidence will show there was an alleyway up from near
the edge of Washington Avenue, and the trench was
constructed that way on that evening." (T. 2). The
eastern limit of the trench was at the alleyway, not at
Washington Avenue.
Second, on page two of his brief appellant says,
"The trench had been dug while appellant was at work
during the day of June 25th. Appellant had had no
opportunity to examine it in the daylight prior to his
injury." But on the contrary, the appellant did have
full opportunity to examine the trench in daylight. The
opening statement says, "That would be the afternoon
or evening of the 25th of June. Mr. Wold carne home
that afternoon at about four o'clock. He noticed that
they were constructing a trench in the street there on
18th Street. I drew a rough sketch, Lady and Gentlemen, and for the purpose of showing what I have to
show, I will indicate without drawing any more lines on
the board, as he came horne, the Miller residence, where
he resided, is located here. (Indicating the area on the
North side of 18th Street immediately West of the
Northerly projection of the West line of Kiesel Avenue.)
. . . . Mr. Wold stopped his car here, (Indicating the
South side of 18th Street, just east of Kiesel. See
chalk mark on sketch.) and at that time he noticed the
construction work going on on this trench. Just exactly
where the trench was at that time I think Mr. Wold was
unable to tell it, but at any rate he went into the Miller
house, changed his clothes and went back downtown to
meet Mrs. Wold." ( T. 2.)
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Even if ~Ir. Wold could not tell just how near to
\Vashington BouleYard the trench had progressed at
four o'clock P. ~I., which is within one hour of quitting
tin1e on public works contracts (see Section 34-4-1, U. C.
A. 1953), it is a clear and necessary inference from the
facts stated that it was substantially past the Miller
house, which was just less than half way along the block.
As the trench was at the alleyway "near" Washington
Boulevard within the hour, it clearly was past the point
where he later attempted to cross it. We doubt that
Counsel for Appellant will contend that Mr. Wold did
not in fact twice cross the "trench at about that point
that afternoon. We respectfully invite the Appellant to
admit that as a fact for the purpose of this Appeal, so
that this matter may be fully considered in accord with
the spirit of the new Rules of Procedure. It is believed
there is really no question as to the actual fact.
Third, the appellant neglected to refer in his statement of facts to that portion of the opening statement
in which he told of a crossing of the trench provided
betwe.en Grant and Kiesel A venues. It was there said,
"He (Mr. Wold) noticed the trench went out on the
edge of the street there (at 18th Street and Grant
Avenue), and there was a small flare-pot on the street
on Grant Avenue and going along the trench and going
up to the Miller hpme to the driveway, the area west of
the driveway, there was a place for people to go in on
the street but way below the Miller property." (T. 3.)
Of course, it is only half a city block from Grant to
Kiesel, so "way below" must have been something less
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than that distance. At any rate Appellant's statement
shows his allegation of failure to provide crossings is
not true, even if relevant and material, which it is not.
Finally, Appellant's statement in his brief (p. 4)
that "The basis of the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint
was that . appellant was contributorily negligent as a
matter of law in attempting to cross the trench and
enter his residence on 18th Street," is only about onefourth of the truth. Defendant's motions to dismiss
were made, and granted, on four separate grounds:
1. The facts stated fail to disclose any negligence
by either defendant, or the violation by either of any
duty owed to plaintiff.
2. 'The stated facts affirmatively show that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
3. The stated facts affirmatively show that defendant voluntarily attempted to cross in the face of dangers
of which he knew or should have known, and therefore
assumed the risk of such injury within the meaning of
the doctrine "volenti non fit injuria."
4. The alleged negligent acts or omissions of the
defendants, if any there were, were not the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries.
· See Transcript,. pp. 7 to 10.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Point 1. The burden is on Appellent to show that
the order of dismissal is erroneous, and as he
has argued only one of four grounds on which
the order was based, he has waived the other
4
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three, and the order must be sustained on those
grounds, which are presumed to be sufficient.
Point 2. The facts stated do not show any negligence by either defendant, or that either
violated any duty owing to plaintiff.
Point 3. The alleged negligence of the defendants
was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's
injuries.
Point 4. The stated facts affirmatively show that
plaintiff voluntarily attempted to cross the
trench in the face of dangers of which he knew
or should have known, and assumed the risk
of injury therefrom within the meaning of the.
doctrine "volenti non fit injuria."
Point 5. The stated facts affirmatively show
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence.
Point 6. The dismissal of Appellant's cause does
not deprive him of his constitutional right of
jury trial as the stated facts present no claim
on which relief could be granted.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1. The burden is on Appellant to show
that the order of dismissal is erroneous, and as he has
argued only one of four grounds on which the order
was based, he has waived the other three, and the order
must be sustained on those grounds, which are presumed
to be sufficient.
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·The decisions of this court have long since settled
beyond any peradventure of a doubt that there is a
presumption that the judgment of the Trial Court was
correct, and that every reasonable intendment must be
indulged in favor of it, and that the burden of affirmatively showing error is on the party complaining thereof,
that is, upon the Appellant here.
Palfreyman vs. Bates and Rogers
Construction Company
108 Utah 142; 158 Pac. 2nd 132, 133, Syllabus
No.2,
and cases there cited.
It is equally well settled in Utah that points of law
or fact, or assignments of error are deemed to be
waived unless presented and argued in the brief of the
Appellant. See
Parry vs. Harris
93 Utah 317,
72 Pac. 2nd 1044 Syllabus No. 9
and the authorities there referred to.
The same rule is applied in the Federal Courts
from which our present Rules of Procedure have been
borrowed.
Mathewson vs. First Trust Company of St.
Joseph, Missouri
100 Fed. 2nd 121,
and
Lewis vs. Standard Oil Company of
California
88 Fed. 2nd 512.
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nioreover, the present Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 75(p) (2), specifically require the Appellant's brief to include a concise statement of the points
upon which the Appellant intends to rely for a reversal
with an argument of each of such points.
In this case, as shown by the transcript of the
proceedings, pages 7 to 10, the motions for dismissal
were each made upon four separate grounds and the
court granted the motions without stating that the order
was based upon less than all of the grounds. Presumptively therefore the court based its dismissal upon
all four grounds. The Appellant here has argued only
the single point of contributory negligence and has
wholly and utterly failed to make any argument whatsoever as to the other grounds of lack of negligence on
the defendants, assumption of risk and lack of a proximate casual relation between the alleged negligence
and plaintiff's injuries. Under these circumstances the
Appellant has waived and abandoned any claim of error
which might have been based upon the entry of an order
of dismissal based on these three specified grounds.
Since no attempt has been made by Appellant to show
that the court erred in entering the order of dismissal
upon these three grounds, and thus is deemed to have
waived any objection on this basis, the effect of the
waiver is to withdraw any such claimed error from the
court's consideration, and thus to sustain the ruling of
the Trial Court. It follows, therefore, that the ruling
of the Trial Court in granting the motions for dismissal
based upon these three grounds not argued in Appellant's brief is in effect sustained. Inasmuch as the
order must be considered validly entered upon each
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of these three grounds, it really becomes unnecessary
to consider the single point of contributory negligence
upon which the appellant has seen fit to argue in his
brief.
The case of
In re: Pichard's Estate
42 Utah 105; 129 Pac. 343, 356,
is in point and supports the position taken by respondents here. This court there held that where there may
have been several reasons for the ruling of the Trial
Court below, and its reasons do not appear, and the
appellant fails to point out where the ruling was in
error, the Supreme Court will assume the reasons are
valid and will not search the record for possible error.
Again the case of
Reid vs. Anderson
116 Utah 455
211 Pac. 2nd 206, 208,
is exactly in point and when considered in connection
with the Pichard case, supra, is determinative of the
case at Bar. In that case the Trial Court dismissed an
action when a plaintiff refused to plead over after a
demurrer made on four separate grounds had been
sustained. In that case the plaintiff-appellant argued
in his brief two of the four grounds on which the
demurrer had been sustained but completely neglected
to argue the other two grounds. This court, with Mr.
Justice Wolfe writing the opinion, and with Chief Justice
Pratt and Justices Wade and McDonough concurring,
held that in failing to argue these two points the appel-
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lant had waived them and that this had the effect of
leaving the order of dismissal adequately supported by
at least two grounds which were not under attack and
that therefore the order of dismissal must be affirmed.
The language there used by the court is so clear and
logical we cannot forebear to quote from it briefly:
""Plaintiffs have argued at some length the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in their complaint
to state a cause of action, and they have also
argued the question of misjoinder of parties
defendant. But they have wholly and utterly
failed to make any argument whatsoever as to
the other two grounds upon which the demurrer
was sustained. It is a rule oft reiterated by
this court, and apparently unheeded by a substantial portion of the bar, that assignments
of error not argued in the printed briefs are
deemed waived. Counsel who asserts error has
the burden of showing that error exists. It
is not our duty to search the record in quest for
error. The rules of this court requiring appellant to set forth assignments of error and to file
printed briefs are based on sound policy of
the law.
"Since no attempt has been made by counsel
for appellants to show that the court erred in
sustaining the demurrers for uncertainty, and
for improperly uniting causes of action without
separately stating them, any assignment of error
as to those rulings is deemed waived. The effect
of a waiver of an assignment of error is to withdraw such assignment of error from our consideration and thus to sustain the ruling of the
trial court. It follows, therefore, that the ruling
of the trial court as to the two grounds of demurrer not argued is, in effect, sustained. That
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is determinative of the case as against the Andersons and it becomes unnecessary to consider
whether the court erred in sustaining on· the two
grounds which have been argued."
It is respectfully submitted that the matters above
considered dispose of the case at Bar and require the
affirmance of the jugment below. In such event is should
not be necessary for the court to proceed to a consideration of the other matters hereinafter discussed. However, out of an abundance of caution we shall now proceed to show that these other points which might have
been raised by the appellant had he considered them to
be potentially fruitful, are without merit. In so doing
the Respondents do not waive the points hereinbefore
developed.
POINT 2. The facts stated do not show any negligence by either defendant, or that either violated any
duty owing to plaintiff.
It is admitted by the pleadings that the trench in
question was constructed and the dirt therefrom piled
on the South side thereof by Wheelwright Construction
Company under contract with Ogden City. The nature
of the trench and its relation to the pile of dirt is
rather clearly shown in Plaintiff's E~ibit A, which
was made a part of the statement. It is obvious that
the trench was dug for the laying of pipe in connection
with some public work not identified in the record.
According to Appellant's opening statement, when
he came home from the party that night he "turned in
here on Grant Avenue. He noticed the trench went out
on the edge of the street there, and there was a small
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flare-pot on the street on Grant Avenue ... and going
up to the :Miller home to the driveway, the area west
of the driveway there was a place for people to go in on
the street but way below the Miller property. We speak
of it as being a high trench or pile of dirt with no openings through it to get to the Miller place." (T. 3). After
parking his car ··~Ir. Wold asked Mrs. Wold to waita
minute. He climbed up over the bank and decided he
could safely cross. He got down on the edge of the
bank, placed one foot on the edge of the trench, . . . .
and had his other foot across on the other side of the
trench, straddling it, so he could help Mrs. Wold across,
when the foot he placed first collapsed under him, the
bank giving out from under his foot." He fell.
(Emphasis added.)
The negligence alleged in the complaint, and stated
in appellant's opening statement consisted of only two
items: (1) That defendants failed to prepare an
opening through the dirt pile and a crossing of the
trench at appellant's home at 336 -18th Street; and (2}
that there was no adequate or sufficient lighting in the
vicinity of 336- 18th Street by which persons could
guide themselves and cross over the dirt pile and trench.
(Complaint, paragraph IV; T 2, 3.)
"That a municipality may temporarily close a street,
where necessary so to do for a reasonable time, is well
settled. Thus a city may close a street pending construction work."
11 McQuillan on Municipal Corporations,
3rd Ed., Section 30.203, p. 170, Note 13,
and cases cited.
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, If the street becomes defective in the course of
public works, the only duty of the city or its contractor
is to erect adequate barriers or warnings. This Court
has recognized that rule in the case of
Niblock vs. Salt Lake City
100 Utah 573; 111 Pac. 2nd 800,
where the Court, speaking through Justice McDonough,
said, in discussing the statute underwhich municipal
liability is postulated:
" 'Such street' has reference to a street in
a defective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed
condition. The liability in any case would be
based on negligence. The obstructed condition
of a street gives rise to no liability if the city
has taken proper precautions. The erection of
adequate barriers and warnings would usually
fulfill the city's duty to the traveling public
though the street be defective."
That the same rule applies to contractors on public
works, such as the Wheelwright Construction Company
here, was held by this Court in
Nielsen v. Christensen-Gardiner
85 Utah 79; 38 Pac. 2nd 743.
There it was held that the erection by the contractor
of an adequate barrier on a street under construction
discharged the contractor's duty to the traveling public.
Again, it is the law that where the nature of the
work in progress is such that it is itself sufficient notice
of the dangerous condition of the street, no artificial
barriers are necessary.
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McCarthy v. Boston
266 1fass. 262; 165 N. E. 123.
The only thing that is necessary is that the means
employed shall be "reasonably sufficient" to warn the
traveling public of the presence of the obstruction or
defect.
19 1\fcQuillan on Municipal Corporations,
3rd Ed., Section 54.99, P. 360, Note 95.
Nor is it necessary that the barricade be such that it
cannot be surmounted or penetrated.
Lineburg v. St. Paul
71 Minn. 245; 73 N. W. 723.
In the case at bar, the pile of dirt south of the
trench, with a flare-pot at the end thereof was an
adequate barrier. It clearly served the purpose for
which it was intended, the appellant saw it, and it
brought home to him the fact of the existence of the
trench. It was in fact "reasonably sufficient" to warn,
and it did warn him of the condition of the street. That
is all the law requires of the people of the city and their
contractor.
But it is interesting to note that appellant does not
here complain of failure to barricade or warn him of the
danger-he complains that the defendants were wrong
in erecting the barricade over which he scrambled to
get at the point of danger! He asserts that the pile
should have been opened to him exactly at his driveway
at 336 -18th Street, and the trench there bridged to
enable him to use that portion of the street as freely as
if no public works were in progress, as freely as if that
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portion of the street had not been temporarily closed to
travel in the interest of safety and the common welfare.
That, of course, is absurd. The city had the right to
close that portion of the street for a reasonable time.
If appellant had the right to insist on the uninterrupted
use of the portion of the street in front of his residence,
so had every other resident of the City, and the City's
right to temporarily close the street has disappeared.
The expense of performing public works on the public
streets would be prohibitive. Indeed, if the public
cannot require a resident to detour for a few yards
around a public works project, public works become
impossible, for they could not be pursued without a
violation of law. As we say, that is absurd.
Moreover, the rule is exactly contrary to that contended for by Appellant. As said in
19 McQuillan on Municipal Corporations,
3rd Ed., Section 54.98, page 357, Note 84,
"Moreover, if necessary to prevent accidents,
a municipality not only may but it is its duty to
close the street to the public by some barrier."
(Emphasis supplied.)
What could have been more dangerous than to
leave an opening without any barricade, and with some
necessarily cheap and makeshift bridge' Such a situation would indeed have been an open invitation to
accident!
The City and the contractor here followed the only
reasonable course. They have not violated any duty,
and were not negligent under the facts stated. The
dismissal must be affirmed on this ground.
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The second complaint made by the appellant was
that the defendants failed to provide sufficient lighting
to light the appellant safely across the barrier and
trench, that is across the closed portion of the street.
It is subn1itted that neither defendant had any duty
to maintain any right to enable the appellant to cross
the closed portion of the street. In general, there is no
duty on any Inunicipality to light its streets.
Herndon vs. Salt Lake City
34 Utah 65 ; 95 Pac. 646.
It follows a fortiori that there is no general duty on a

private corporation or citizen to light the public streets.
Moreover, it is not ordinarily the duty of the city
to place lights or warning signals, or to put up barriers
along the margins of its streets, or to mark or define the
wrought or travelled portions of them. "These are required only to point out obstructions or excavations in
the travelled part of the street, or, where the whole
street is open, to point out where they are so that they
may be avoided." Herndon vs. Salt Lake City, supra.
In this case it is clear from the pleadings and from
the opening statement of the appellant that the excavation and obstruction of which he complained was "pointed
out" to him and he knew of its existence. From the
comment in the opening statement that the appell~nt
"looked the situation over" and scrambled up over the
dirt barrier and straddled the trench, it is obvious that
there was sufficient lighting to enable him to know of
the existence of the obstruction and excavation. That
was all that was required. From that point on he was

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on his own and if he was injured, it was the result of
his own fool hardiness in proceeding in the face of a
known danger. The purpose of special lighting had
already been accomplished and it is obvious that no
additional lighting was called for. In failing to provide
it the defendants were not negligent.
There is an additional reason for holding that the
defendant Ogden City was not negligent in this case.
It is admitted by the pleadings that the defendant Wheelwright Construction Company constructed the trench in
question. There is nothing in the opening statement to
show that Ogden City had either actual or constructive
notice of the defect or defects in 18th Street, of which
the plaintiff complains, nor does it- appear that the
Wheelwright Construction Company was the agent of
the City, but on the contrary the pleading, with no statement to the contrary, is that Wheelwright was an
independent contractor. Such indeed is the fact.
The asserted liability of the city can therefore be
based only upon the theory that it allowed a dangerous
condition to continue ~fter actual or constructive notice
thereof and reasonable opportunity to correct the defect.
This court has held in substance that a municipality is
not liable for injury for failure to exercise ordinary care
to keep its public ways in a reasonably safe condition
unless it had actual or constructive notice of the defect
and an opportunity to correct the same.
Jensen vs. Logan City
89 Utah 347; 57 Pac. 2nd 708.
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Such is the general rule. See
19 McQuillan on Municipal Corporations,
3rd Ed., Section 54.102.
In the case of
~Iorris

vs. Salt Lake City
35 Utah 474, 101 Pac. 373,

the court held the City liable for damages resulting from
a dangerous condition in the street only because it was
determined as a fact that the city's inspector was present
and had an opportunity to see the dangerous condition
and that more than four days had elapsed after the
creation of the condition and before the accident so that
the city was held to have notice.
In this case the condition complained of had existed
only a matter of hours and there is nothing in the
pleadings or in the opening statement of the appellant
to show that the City had either actual or constructive
notice or any opportunity to correct the situation. Thus,
even if it should be held that the situation in front of
the ~filler home negligently created a hazardous condition with respect to the appellant, still the City would
not be liable therefor and the order appealed from was
properly entered as to the City and should be affirmed.
POINT 3. The alleged negligence of the defendants
was not the proximate cause of appellant's injuries.
There are really two phases of this point : (a) The
accident was not caused by either of the alleged acts
of negligence, but by the natural crumbling of the lip
of the freshly dug trench under appellant's added weight,
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a phenomenon frequently encountered in new excavations; and (b) the acts of the appellant himself in
scrambling over the barricade into the closed portion
of the street, and attempting to cross the new trench in
the dark and in placing his full weight on the brink
thereof, constitute a distinct, successive, unrelated and
effecient intervening cause of the accident.
It is, of course, a fundamental principle of the law
of torts that even if negligence were conceded to exist,
which here it is not, if there is an intervening efficient
cause, no liability against the person originally negligent
can be predicated. As stated in
65 CJS, Page 685,

"An intervening cause which breaks the chain
of causation from the original negligent act or
my.ission will be regarded as the proximate
cause relieving the original wrongdoer of
liability."
And in
65 CJS, Page 693,
it is said,
"Liability cannot be predicated on a prior
and remote cause which merely furnishes the
condition or occasion for an injury resulting from
an intervening unrelated and efficient cause, even
though the injury would not have resulted but
for such condition or occasion."
These rules are so fundamental and so well known
that it seems useless to cite additional authorities on
these points.
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In this case the alleged negligence was first the
failure to provide a crossing for appellant at his front
door so that he could without any inconvenience cross
the closed portion of the street and second, the failure
to light the locality of the closed portion of the street
by his front door so that he could safely cross the barrier
and the closed portion of the street without danger or
injury. It must, however, be noticed from the opening
staten1ent of the appellant that the accident happened
when the appellant stood astraddle of the trench with
one foot upon either lip thereof and one lip of the trench
caved in under his added weight, allowing him to fall.
Obviously here it could not be anticipated by any
reasonable prudent man that the appellant would wrongfully attempt to cross the street under dark and dangerous conditions, as he himself claims, and that he would
plant his full weight upon the immediate lip of the
trench. Obviously, the real cause of the accident was
the act of the appellant in pushing his weight upon the
lip of the freshly dug trench. It is a matter of common
human knowledge that freshly dug trenches with vertical
sides tend to cave in whenever any additional pressure
is placed upon the lip, and indeed they are frequently
subject to caving even without the addition of extra
weight or pressure. This is a matter of common knowledge which every reasonable prudent man must contemplate. It is very clear that it was not the lack of light
or the failure to provide adequate crossings which were
the proximate causes of the accident; it was the act of
the appellant in adding his weight to the lip of the
freshly dug trench. Obviously there was sufficient
light to enable him to locate the trench and to find his
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way over the barrier and the caving in of the lip of the
trench was something that would have happened as well
in daylight as in the dark under the conditions provailing here. It was the appellant's own act which
was the proximate cause of the accident and the acts
of the defendants, if any, at most merely furnished
the condition or occasion for the injury resulting from
intervening unrelated and efficient cause which was
the appellant's act in exerting additional pressure on
the lip of the trench.
In this connection it perhaps should be observed
that the appellant was not in the exercise of any right
in attempting to cross the trench at this particular
time. As has heretofore been demonstrated, the city
and its contractor had the right to close the portion
of the trench involved in the public works construction
and when so closed and by the barricade marked with
a light at the end thereof the appellant's right to the
use of that portion of the street ceased and in attempting to use it he was acting wrongfully and was in
effect a trespasser. It was his duty to go around the
ends of the trench which he could have done by going
eastward to the end of the trench at the alleyway just
west of Washington Boulevard, less than a half a
block away or westward around the west end of the
trench at Grant A venue which was less than half a
block from his front door.
It seems so very clear that reasonable minds could
not differ in holding that the accident was caused by
the appellant's act in unlawfully proceeding across a

20
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

closed portion of the street in the face of known dangers and established warnings and barricades. It was
not caused by any negligence of either defendant here
and the order dismissing the complaint was properly
entered and should be affirmed.
POINT 4. The stated facts affirmatively show
that plaintiff voluntarily attempted to cross the trench
in the face of dangers of which he knew or should have
known and assumed the risk of injury therefrom within
the meaning of the doctrine "volenti non fit injuria."
The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" liberally translated, means that to which a person assents is not
deemed in law to be a legal injury. See
44 Words and Phrases,
Permanent Edition,
368, et seq.
The doctrine of assumption of risk is one phase of
the application of the legal maxim volenti non fit injuria.
During the early development of the doctrine of assumption of risk it was sometimes said to apply only where
the relationship of the employer and employee obtained,
whereas the broader aspects of the maxim applied to
cases where there was no such relationship. It appears
now, however, that this nice distinction has broken down
and that the convenient and descriptive phrase "assumption of risk" is applied substantially to all cases
where the maxim would apply.
In cases such as this the doctrine of assumption
of risk in its broader aspects and the doctrine of contributory negligence frequently overlap and are not in-
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frequently confused by the courts. Under some facts
both defenses are applicable. Such we believe to be
the case here.
The various doctrines of contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, volenti non fit injuria are carefully
defined and distinguished and apply with outstanding
logic and clarity in the case of
Walsh vs. West Coast Mines
. (Washington, 1948)
197 Pac. 2nd 233.
That case is of particular interest here because it
involves a case of a cave-in in a mine into which the
plaintiff entered after a prior cave-in knowing that a
subsequent cave-in would not be at all unlikely. The
court there comments that there are many cases in
which assumption of risk or the doctrine of volenti
non fit injuria may bar recovery even though the injured
person might be free from contributory negligence.
In that case the plaintiff was a Govern1nent mine inspector and had no contractual relation with the owner
of the mine in which he received his injuries.
The distinction between the doctrines of contributory negligence, of volenti non fit injuria and assumption of risk are also carefully considered and analyzed in
Volume 65 Harvard Law Review,
Page 623,
in which the rather recent Federal case of
Swift & Company vs. Schuster
192 Fed. 2nd 615,
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is rather stringently criticized by Dr. Warren Seavey,
Bussey Professor of Law at Harvard Law School because the majority opinion in that case failed to appreciate and properly apply the doctrine of assumption
of risk in its various ramifications. In the case there
considered by the learned commentator a Government
inspector in a packing plant had stepped down from a
twenty-three inch high platform onto a floor, which was
necessarily wet and slippery because of the nature of
the business, instead of going around by another way
down where there were provided hand holds to steady
him. ~e slipped, fell and was injured. The commentator says that in that case it appears clear that there
was no jury question.
Again in the case of
Southern Pacific Company
vs. McCready
47 Fed. 2nd 673, 676,
it is said that the doctrine of assumption of risk in the
broader sense may apply when no relation by contract
exists within the limits of the maxim "volenti non fit
injuria." If one knowing and comprehending the danger, voluntarily exposes himself to it, though not negligent in so doing, he is deemed to have assumed the risk
and is precluded from a recovery for an injury resulting therefrom. And in the case of
LaPorte vs. Houston
189 Pac. 2nd 544,
it was held that if an injured person has the knowledge
or means of knowledge of exist~nce of a danger, or if
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the danger is obvious, he assumes the risk of such danger
when he places himself in a position where it might
strike, and he cannot recover if injury results.
In this case the Appellant obviously knew of the
danger for he stopped to look the situtation over before proceeding and then voluntarily decided to proceed
in the face thereof. Moreover, as has been before
suggested, the danger of the lip of a freshly dug trench
caving in under additional weight is obvious and is
common knowledge, with which all persons of ordinary
mentality must be charged.
In the case of
Dingman vs. A. F. Mattock
96 Pac. 2nd 821 ;
104 Pac. 2nd 26,
the California Court of Appeals held that a subcontractQr who sustained injuries when a scantling which
had been placed across an open stairway broke as he
sought to ascend thereby from one level to another was
barred by assumption of risk, as well as by contribubutory negligence, from recovering from the general contractor for his injuries. Here is a case much like the
one before the court where the injured party assumed
the risk of the insufficiency of the footing chosen by
him to sustain his weight.
The Iowa Supreme Court in the case of
Gowing vs. Henry Field C01npany
281 N. W. 281
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held that an independent plumbing contractor attempting to step off a roof over a balustrads sixteen inches
high and twelve inches wide onto a fire escape, which
had no railing, and who fell, assumed the risk entailed
by such conduct as a matter of law. This case again
is very much like the case at bar in that it involves an
atten1pt by the injured person to step across a situation in which the dangers are patent and obvious. The
Massachusetts Court in the case of
Engel vs. Boston Ice Company
4 N. E. 2nd 455,
held that the principle of assumption of risk involved
where a servant who knows that proper precautions
have been neglected by his master, and still knowingly
consents to proceed in the face of the risk to which he will
be exposed, and that his assent dispenses with the duty
of the master as to such risk applies with equal force to
the employee of a subcontractor of an independent contractor constructing an ice plant for the ice company.
Again it was held in the case of
Regenbogen vs. Southern Shipwrecking
Corporation
41 Southern 2nd 110,
that even an invitee assumes all normal and ordinary
risks attendant upon the use of the premises wherein he
enters, and that the owner is not liable for injury to the
invitee resulting from a danger which was obvious or
which should have been observed in the exercise of
ordinary care. A case particularly applicable here, in
view of the appellant's opening statement to the effect
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that he voluntarily chose to cross the closed portion of
the street in the face of the dangers there apparent as
against the alternative course of going around the ends
of the trench a distance of a few yards, in the case of
Hall vs. Ziegler
64 Atl. 2nd 767,
decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1949.
That court there held that where a person choses a place
of danger in preference to one of comparative safety,
and by reason of his choice is injured, his own act
amounts to an "assumption of risk" and he cannot recover. In this case the appellant could when he became
aware of the trench as he entered 18th Street have
there parked his car and walked up the sidewalk on
the north side of the street for the purpose of entering
his home. An ordinary prudent man would have chosen
this absolutely safe course as against the dangerous
alternative of clambering over the barricading pile of
dirt and attempting to cross the trench in the closed
portion of the street. When the appellant here chose
the dangerous as against the safe course, he assumed
all risks incident to the former and cannot recover for
his injuries suffered in the course of pursuing the
dangerous course.
The case of
LaPorte vs. Houston, supra, ·
is worthy of a little further consideration at this point.
In that case the injured party brought his automobile,
which had not been behaving properly, to the defendant's
garage for a checkup. He stood in front of the car
26
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while the engine was running as the defendant mechanic
worked over the car in checking it. The car suddenly
and inexplicably jumped forward and struck the injured
plaintiff. The California Court there said:
~·rf the plaintiff has knowledge or the means
of knowledge of the existence of a danger, or if
the danger is obvious, he assumes such danger
when he places himself in a position where it
might strike .... conceding that appellant (the
plaintiff) did not know of the danger that his
gear lever would automatically jump from the
neutral slot to the drive slot as he testified, by
what mode of reasoning can he obviate the consequences of the danger of standing in front of
his car parked frontwards on a declevity and
undergoing a test. He was there on the advice or
suggestion of another. If either party then had
means of knowledge of the peril there was
apparent . . . . with such knowledge available
he should have sought a place of safety out of
bounds of the car's jump. By standing in front
of it he assumed the dangers inherent in his own
internally defective machine." (Emphasis added).

The principle there enunciated is directly applicable
here for the appellant here voluntarily chose to stand on
the lip of the trench and assumed the risk of its unexpectedly crumbling away from under him,
The case of
Buckingham vs. Commary-Peterson
Company
178 Pac. 318
(California District Court of Appeal, Rehearing Denied by Supreme Court February 10, 1919),
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involves an accident on a road in which a public works
project was in process. The road itself was under reconstruction. The plaintiff there lived in the vicinity
and knew that the road had been torn up in the course
of reconstruction. He complained that there were no
barriers or lights to protect him from driving his automobile into a certain open culvert crossing over the
travelled portion of the highway. The court said:
"With the knowledge which the plaintiff had
of the condition of the highway over which he
attempted to make his way to Suisun, it is, as
above stated, a matter of no material importance
whether the barriers were maintained across the
road or lights kept at points where there were
obstructions caused by the tearing up of the
road or the piling thereon of materials to be
used in the work of construction. Barriers and
lights and such other warnings placed on streets
or highways which are undergoing construction
or improvement are for those of the traveling
public who have no knowledge or previous notice
of the conditions which render the thoroughfare
unsafe to use. Therefore, those having actual
knowledge of the existence of such unsafe conditions, or who, having had such knowledge,
attempt to use the street or highway without first
informing themselves as to whether such conditions have been removed and the highway thus
made suitable and safe for general use, do so at
their own peril." (Emphasis added.)
The California Court there quotes with approval from
the case of
Compton vs. Revere
179 Mass. 413
60 N. E. 931
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in which the ~fassachusetts Court said:
"It is obvious that the plaintiff knew all that
there was to know about the condition of things,
and in attempting to use the street, did at his
peril ..... Nor do we regard it as material that
prior to the accident some wagons were driven
over the streets. There are always persons who
take risks, if a shortcut can be made, and who
will go over a street even if it is obviously not
open to public travel." (Emphasis added.)
The court in the Buckingham case also quotes with
approval from the West Virginia case of
Shriver vs. Marion County Court
66 S. E. 1062, 26 LRA (N. S.) 377:
"The liberty, right and power of the citizen
in respect to the use of highways being very
broad, it is neither unreasonable nor unjust to
require him to avail himself of his wide latitude
of choice, impose upon him the duty to exercise
reasonable care and prudence, and hold him
guilty of contributory negligence when by reason
of his omission thereof, injury results to him or
his property. As in all other cases arising under
the law of negligence his voluntary and unnecessary encountering of dangers amounts to an
assumption of risk and bars recovery, if he had
knowledge of the danger, or by reason of its
obviousness, he was bound to know it." (Emphasis
added)
In the case at bar the appellant was not compelled
to attempt to cross the closed portion of the street and
to place his weight upon either lip of the trench while
straddling it. He had an easy alternative, but he like
some of the other people to whom the quotations have
referred supra, preferred to proceed in the face of
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danger and to take the risk. The appellant could have
chosen the easy and proper alternative of walking a
few steps around the end of the trench instead of
attempting to cross the same at night and in a particularly dangerous manner, that is, by placing his weight
on either side for the purpose of helping his wife across.
In this connection it is interesting to note that the
appellant appreciated the danger to such an extent that
he instructed his wife to wait and not to cross the dirt
barrier until he had satisfied his own liberal ideas
regarding the risks they were incurring in attempting
improperly to cross the trench in the closed portion of
the street. We are not dealing here with a snap judgment taken under stress of any emergency, but with a
considered weighing of the chances and a voluntary
and needless assumption of the risk of obvious danger.
The appellant has no right in law to recover under the
facts stated and the order appealed from should be
affirmed for the reasons outlined.
POINT 5. The stated facts affirmatively show that
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
It is believed that little more need be said on this
point. Many of the obervations made and authorities
cited under the question of assumption of risk are
equally applicable to the question of the contributory
negligence of the appellant. We will add only a few
authorities bearing particularly on this question.
In the case of
Cody vs. Boston
154 N. E. 753,
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the Massachusetts Court held that a plaintiff injured
by attempting to cross a street not opened for travel
was contributory negligent as a matter of law. Again
the Supreme Court of Arizona in
City of Glendale vs. Sutter
95 Pac. 2nd 560,
held that a plaintiff who was injured when she went to
dump table scraps in a garbage container in a public
alley at the rear of her home at night and without a
light and there stumbled over a cement irrigation box
maintained by the city, the existence of which she knew,
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law, and that it was error to fail to direct a verdict in
favor of the defendant city.
The California Court in
Buckingham vs. Commary-Peterson
Company, Supra,
in addition to holding that the plaintiff there proceeded
at his own peril upon a closed street, held that in so
doing the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law and that no jury question was
involved.
This court very recently affirmed a judgment of
non-suit upon the ground of the affirmative appearance
of contributory negligence in a case quite similar to
the one at bar. The case is
Knox vs. Snow
229 Pac. 2nd 874.
In that case the plaintiff was an invitee in a garage.
He stepped over a hydraulic hoist which extended about
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eight inches from the floor and which was a few feet
from the grease pit and continued on toward the tire
rack upon which his attention was centered. He stopped
his left foot resting on or near the rim of the pit. After
standing there a moment he shifted his weight from one
foot to another and in doing so his left foot slipped, he
lost his balance and fell into the well. In grasping at
a ladder to save himself he suffered the injuries for
which he sought recovery. This court held that he was
properly ruled guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law because he knew or reasonably should have
known of the peril and might have avoided it by the
exercise of ordinary care. The court commented that
the plaintiff there neglected to use the care required
of a prudent man traversing a shop having hazards
readily discernible even to one with impaired vision
where the shop was a place of having known dangers. In
the case at bar the plaintiff is equally guilty of failure
to exercise reasonable care for his own safety.
It is submitted that the facts before this court
hardly need the citation of these or any other authorities
on this point. It seems clear that no reasonable minds
could differ in holding the appellant here negligent in
proceeding at night with insufficient lighting to scramble
across a barrier onto the closed portion of the street
and thereto to poise his weight on either lip of a nPwl~'
dug trench was not taking the care for his own safety
which an ordinary prudent man should do. In this
connection it must be observed that under the circumstances here existing, and contrary to appellant's statement on page 9 of his brief, the appellant had no right
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to use that portion of the public street where he fell
and was injured. That portion was closed in the interest
of the promotion of necessary public works and two
alternative ways were readily available to him around
each end of the trench which were less than half a block
away in either dir8ction. The appellant here willfully
proceeded in the face of a known danger and risk and
without regard to his own safety and without any right
so to do. In so doing he failed to have that care for
his own safety that an ordinary prudent man under the
circumstances would have and as a matter of law he
was guilty of contributory negligence barring recovery.
In this connection it should also be observed that
the appellant was under no compulsion to choose this
dangerous alternative as against the safe alternative.
As the city and its contractor were within their rights in
closing and barricading that portion of the street he
was deprived of no right in being impliedly requested
temporarily to go around the dangerous trench and he
was not asked to sacrifice any right which he had in
foregoing the shortcut which he attempted. He was not
compelled to forego any legal right in order to take
reasonable care for his own safety, and in proceeding
into a dangerous place on the street where he had no
right to be he was guilty of contributory negligence.
Under these circumstances the rules stated in the
American Law Institute Restatement of the
Law of Torts, Volume 2, Page 1243,
referred to by appellant on pages 7, 8 and 18, and the
authorities dealing with the duty of care in the exercise
by appellant of a legal right are not in point.
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It is submitted that it is clear from the pleadings
and the statement of facts that the appellant here was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and
that the order of dismissal was properly granted and
should be affirmed.
POINT 6. The dismissal of appellant's cause does
not deprive him of his constitutional right of jury trial,
as the stated facts present no claim on which relief could
be granted.
Here again little need be said for appellant's arguments on this score obviously constitute a grasping at
a straw. It is a universally recognized rule that where,
as here, the undisputed facts show that the plaintiff is
not entitled to relief a dismissal by the court does not
deprive a plaintiff of his constitutional right to jury
trial. In fact under such circumstances the right to
jury trial never existed as all lawyers know. This court
has already passed on that question, and against the
contention of the appellant here, in the case of
Raymond vs. Union Pacific Railroad
Company
113 Utah 26; 191 Pac. 2nd 137.
In passing it is interesting to note that the Constitution nowhere guarantees the plaintiff a jury trial
in a case such as this. The right to a jury trial in a
civil case in Utah exists if at all by virtue of statute or
the rules of procedure and not otherwise. See the
Constitution of Utah
Article I, Section 10.
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CONCLUSION
It is Yery respectfully submitted that under any
one or all of the considerations herein discussed the
action of the trial court in dismissing the plaintiff's
cause was eminently correct and in accordance with law
and just and should be affirmed. If cities and their
contractors are to be subjected to liability upon such
shallow grounds as those here urged, then the municipalities, which are nationally in dire financial straits,
as the court will judicially know, will indeed be unable
to proceed with any construction work in their streets
for the purpose of supplying their citizens with the
service for which the municipalities are primarily organized. To make the city and its contractors here liable
would be to impose upon them a rule which would make
them substantially insurers of the safety of all persons
injured in the public streets even though they be within
portions of the public streets which are temporarily
withdrawn from travel. We do not believe that this
court will impose upon the people any such unfair rule.

Respectfully submitted,
PAUL THATCHER
Corporation Counsel for Ogden City
1018 First Security Bank Building
Ogden, Utah
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN
Attorneys for Respondent Wheelwright
Construction Company
1018 First Security Bank Building
Ogden, Utah
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